Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market
Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market
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DOI：
10.1145/3308558.3313454
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发表时间：
2019-05
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Lavi;Or Sattath;Aviv Zohar
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文献类型：
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作者：
R. Lavi;Or Sattath;Aviv Zohar
比特币支付系统涉及两种代理类型：使用货币进行交易并支付费用的用户和负责授权交易并保护系统以换取这些费用的矿工。比特币的两个挑战是（i）随着区块奖励的减少，确保足够的矿工收入，以及（ii）由于最大区块大小上限较小而减轻吞吐量限制。这些问题是密切相关的，因为增加最大区块大小可能会减少收入，因为比特币的支付你的出价方法。为了将它们解耦，我们分析了“垄断拍卖”[8]，显示：（i）它的收入不会随着最大区块大小的增加而减少，（ii）它对不受信任的拍卖者（矿工）有弹性，以及（iii）交易发行者（投标人）的简单性，因为随着投标数量的增加，来自策略性投标阴影（相对于投标人的真实最大支付意愿）的平均收益减少。
The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: Users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin's challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin's pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the “monopolistic auction” [8], showing: (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one's true maximal willingness to pay) diminishes as the number of bids increases.