The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models
The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models
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竞争经济中的生产过程：瓦尔拉斯、新霍布斯和马克思主义模型
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发表时间：
1985
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通讯作者：
S. Bowles
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作者：
S. Bowles
考虑到效率，我们把艾德从。事实上，正如我们将在倒数第二节中看到的那样，资本主义的阶级结构导致了特别高水平的工作阻力，从而促进了监督投入的广泛使用，这一论断将马克思主义者与新霍布斯主义者的观点区分开来。但是，上述论点既不涉及从监督投入中抽象出来，也不认为监督是一种通过内生产生的劳动负效用而诱发的虚假需要。恰恰相反，具有外生决定的劳动力榨取功能的纯监督投入s为上述论点提供了一个特别明确的案例。考虑图1中所示的isowork函数，它表示能够产生一个单位输出的工作量。从a点开始，如果企业沿着这一点前进，爱德华兹（1979）将其称为“技术控制”，以区别于生产过程的“官僚控制”或“简单控制”。第75卷第1期鲍尔斯：竞争性经济中的生产过程29等工作轨迹通过提高工资和减少监督投入，劳动力成本将上升，因此利润率将下降，但单位投入的产出将上升（1* 保持不变，s下降）。这一结果的产生是因为在劳动力提取函数中，监督和工资率之间存在权衡，而监督投入是资源使用的，工资率不是;因此提高工资和降低监督可能是有效的，但不是有利可图的。因此，成本最小化和效率并不一致：在这种情况下，权衡的不是效率与公平，而是效率与公平。
ed from in consideration of efficiency. Indeed, as we shall see in the penultimate section, the assertion that the class structure of capitalism induces a particularly high level of work resistance and hence promotes the extensive use of surveillance inputs differentiates the Marxian from the neo-Hobbesian view. But the above argument involves neither abstracting from surveillance inputs, nor considering surveillance to be a kind of false need induced through an endogenously generated disutility of labor. Quite the contrary, pure surveillance inputs s, with an exogenously determined labor extraction function, provide a particularly clear case of the above argument. Consider the indicated isowork function in Figure 1 as representing an amount of work effort capable of producing one unit of output. Starting at point a, were the firm to move along this 22Edwards (1979) refers to this as "technical control" in contradistinction to "bureaucratic control" or "simple control" of the production process. VOL. 75 NO. 1 BOWLES: PRODUCTION PROCESS IN A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 29 isowork locus by raising wages and cutting surveillance inputs, the cost of labor would rise and hence the profit rate would fall, but output per unit of input would rise (1* remaining constant and s falling). This result arises because there is a tradeoff between surveillance and the wage rate in the labor extraction function, and while surveillance inputs are resource-using, the wage rate is not; hence raising wages and lowering surveillance may be efficient but not profitable. Thus cost minimization and efficiency do not coincide: the tradeoff in this case is not efficiency vs. equity, but efficiency vs.