Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth
Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth
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DOI：
10.1257/pol.20140160
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发表时间：
2016-02-01
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
Rehavi, M. Marit
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Johnson, Erin M.;Rehavi, M. Marit
本文提供了新的证据，病人的信息和医生的经济激励之间的相互作用。利用丰富的分娩微观数据，我们比较了医生和非医生的治疗。我们还利用HMO拥有的医院的存在来确定治疗差距如何随提供者的经济激励而变化。与诱导需求一致，医生接受剖腹产的可能性降低了约10%，其中只有四分之一的影响可归因于差异分类。虽然经济激励会影响非医生的治疗，但医生-患者基本上不受影响。医生也有更好的健康结果。
This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers' financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes.