Critical Empiricism: [Comment]
Critical Empiricism: [Comment]
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批判经验主义:[评论]
DOI:
10.1086/492249
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发表时间:
1989
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
W. Whitford
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
W. Whitford
There is a fundamental paradox for research that is traditionally described as "empirical." The ostensible purpose of this research is to learn something by observation. Yet, as Trubek and Esser emphasize, observation cannot be objective or value free. There are two related problems that render all observation inherently value laden. Description of the social world requires that we group discrete phenomena into categories that we believe, or are trained to believe, describe significant social happenings. In our language we describe these categories with a single word, and come to think of them as a single phenomenon, rather than the grouping of discrete phenomena that could have been grouped in some other way. Thus, we talk of disputes, and we are trained to think of a marital spat and resistance by an enterprise to an environmental protection agency's order as related social phenomena. But we do not think of the question whether Ivan Lendl or Mats Wilander is the world's best tennis player as related, because we are not trained to describe this as a "dispute." Consistently, the process by which the latter question gets resolved we call a "game" rather than "disputes processing." The categories we use today were created by our forebears, and they commonly reflect preferences about how society should be organized that were widely shared in the culture in which they were created. In Trubek and Esser's terminology, the categories of social behavior in use today in empirical research are at least partly a product of ideologies that have been dominant in relevant population subgroups.'