Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice, and Punishment at the Frontlines of Welfare Reform
Deciding to Discipline: Race, Choice, and Punishment at the Frontlines of Welfare Reform
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决定纪律：福利改革前沿的种族、选择和惩罚
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Linda Houser
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sanford F. Schram;Joe Soss;Richard C. Fording;Linda Houser
福利制裁是对不遵守福利计划规则的个人的经济处罚。它们的广泛使用反映了对贫困管理采取学科方法的转变。在这篇文章中，我们调查了隐性种族偏见和不可信的社会标记如何相互作用，以塑造官员的决定，实施制裁。我们目前的实验证据的基础上假设的小插曲，案件经理更有可能建议制裁拉丁裔和黑人客户，但不是白色客户，当存在不名誉的标记。我们对这些发现进行三角分析，并对国家行政数据进行分析。我们对拉丁美洲人的研究结果喜忧参半，但我们发现一致的证据表明，当一个不可信的标记（即，对不遵守规定的事先制裁）附加于黑人而不是白色福利客户。总的来说，我们的研究澄清了少数民族，特别是非洲裔美国人，在纪律福利提供的新世界中更有可能因越轨行为而受到惩罚。
Welfare sanctions are financial penalties applied to individuals who fail to comply with welfare program rules. Their widespread use reflects a turn toward disciplinary approaches to poverty management. In this article, we investigate how implicit racial biases and discrediting social markers interact to shape officials' decisions to impose sanctions. We present experimental evidence based on hypothetical vignettes that case managers are more likely to recommend sanctions for Latina and black clients—but not white clients—when discrediting markers are present. We triangulate these findings with analyses of state administrative data. Our results for Latinas are mixed, but we find consistent evidence that the probability of a sanction rises significantly when a discrediting marker (i.e., a prior sanction for noncompliance) is attached to a black rather than a white welfare client. Overall, our study clarifies how racial minorities, especially African Americans, are more likely to be punished for deviant behavior in the new world of disciplinary welfare provision.