Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology
Constitutive Rules, Language, and Ontology
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构成规则、语言和本体论
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发表时间：
2009
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通讯作者：
F. Hindriks
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作者：
F. Hindriks
在哲学中，制度的本体论可以用构成规则来捕捉，这是司空见惯的。然而，这些规则到底是什么，目前还不是很清楚。它们通常与规范性规则形成对比：构成规则(如国际象棋规则)使制度性行动成为可能，而规范性规则(如礼仪规则)与可独立于此类规则执行的行动有关。然而，一些人坚持认为，规范性规则和构成规则之间的区别仅仅是语言上的区别。在本文中，我提出了构成规则的现状说明，以回应这一批评。根据地位账户，构成规则与机构地位有关，地位应按照地位规则来理解。地位规则涉及机构的赋权和制约作用，构成规则规定了机构发挥这些作用所必须满足的前提条件。尽管我最终赞同所提到的区别是语言上的区别这一说法，但我继续辩称，构成规则用于使之显而易见的潜在现实。
It is a commonplace within philosophy that the ontology of institutions can be captured in terms of constitutive rules. What exactly such rules are, however, is not well understood. They are usually contrasted to regulative rules: constitutive rules (such as the rules of chess) make institutional actions possible, whereas regulative rules (such as the rules of etiquette) pertain to actions that can be performed independently of such rules. Some, however, maintain that the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is merely a linguistic one. In this paper I present the status account of constitutive rules in order to address this criticism. According to the status account constitutive rules pertain to institutional statuses and statuses are to be understood in terms of status rules. Status rules concern the enabling and constraining roles of institutions, and constitutive rules specify the preconditions that have to be met in order for them to play these roles. Even though I end up endorsing the claim that the distinction mentioned is a linguistic one, I go on to argue that there is an underlying reality that constitutive rules serve to make apparent.