The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre
The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre
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康德和萨特的先验唯心主义
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发表时间：
2016
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通讯作者：
R. Aquila
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作者：
R. Aquila
他在《存在与虚无导论》中开篇《存在的追求》，指出在“现代思想”的最近发展中可以找到“相当大的进步”。这里所讨论的是一种新的方式--大概至少是自贝克莱以来的新方式--“将存在物还原为一系列表现它的现象”。这表明，进一步的改进是必要的。但新方法至少有一个优点，那就是用“现象的一元论”（3/11）来取代或有望取代某些令人反感的二元论。
Sartre opens “The Pursuit of Being”, his Introduction to Being and Nothingness, noting that “considerable progress” can be found in a recent development of “modern thought”. What is in question is a new manner — presumably, new at least since Berkeley — of “reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it”. Sartre makes it clear that further refinement is in order. But the new approach has at least the advantage of replacing, or promising to replace, some objectionable dualisms with a “monism of the phenomenon” (3/11).1