On the price of being selfish in large populations of plug-in electric vehicles
On the price of being selfish in large populations of plug-in electric vehicles
复制标题
关于大量插电式电动汽车中自私的代价
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Lygeros
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Marina González Vayá;Sergio Grammatico;G. Andersson;J. Lygeros
我们考虑的问题，最优调度的灵活电力需求的车队的插入式电动汽车（PEVs）。更具体地说，我们分析了以下充电优化问题的解决方案：福利最优问题，其中整体系统成本最小化;车队最优问题，其中车队作为一个整体的充电成本最小化的中央代理，即PEV聚合器;自私的最优问题，其中非合作PEVs的目标是最小化他们的个人充电成本。对于同质PEV车队和简化的问题设置，我们表明，三种不同的方法的解决方案对应于不同的山谷填充结果。一个主要的见解是，随着PEV人口的增长，自私的最优解收敛到福利最优解。另一方面，我们表明，集中的车队最优的PEV聚合的解决方案可以通过分散的自私的最优的解决方案，相对于一个适当的价格信号，人口规模的增长。最后，我们展示了我们的技术成果，一个现实的PEV车队的案例研究。
We consider the problem of optimally scheduling the flexible electricity demand of a fleet of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). More specifically, we analyze the solutions of the following charging optimization problems: the welfare-optimal problem, where the overall system cost is minimized; the fleet-optimal problem, where the charging cost of the fleet as a whole is minimized by a central agent, that is the PEV aggregator; the selfish-optimal problem, where the noncooperative PEVs aim at minimizing their individual charging cost. For a homogenous PEV fleet and a simplified problem setup, we show that the solutions of the three different approaches correspond to different valley-filling results. A main insight is that, as the population of PEVs grows, the selfish-optimal solution converges to the welfare-optimal solution. On the other hand, we show that the centralized fleet-optimal solution of the PEV aggregation can be recovered via decentralized selfish-optimal solutions with respect to an appropriate price signal as the population size grows. Finally, we demonstrate our technical results on a realistic PEV fleet case study.