The organization of discipline: From performance management to perversity and punishment
The organization of discipline: From performance management to perversity and punishment
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纪律的组织：从绩效管理到反常与惩罚
DOI：
10.1093/jopart/muq095
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Sanford F. Schram
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Joe Soss;Richard C. Fording;Sanford F. Schram
通过参与观察、深度访谈和行政数据的统计分析，本文探讨了绩效管理在佛罗里达州福利过渡计划中的运作及其对制裁福利客户决策的影响。与大多数关于福利制裁的计量经济学研究不同，我们将制裁视为一种有组织的实践，不仅反映了客户的特征和行为，还反映了组织的需求、惯例、价值观、权威关系、环境和奖惩制度。我们的分析侧重于纪律的组织，并在此过程中表明，当学者们未能解释组织和管理形成制裁模式的动态方式时，他们可能会歪曲和误解纪律的发生率。
Drawing on participant observation, in-depth interviews, and statistical analysis of administrative data, this article explores the operation of performance management in the Florida Welfare Transition program and its effects on decisions to sanction welfare clients. Unlike most econometric research on welfare sanctions, we approach sanctioning as an organized practice that reflects, not just client characteristics and behaviors, but also organizational needs, routines, values, authority relations, environments, and systems of reward and punishment. Our analysis focuses on the organization of discipline and, in the process, suggests that scholars may misrepresent and misinterpret the incidence of discipline when they fail to account for the dynamic ways that organization and management shape sanctioning patterns.