Beingg: Gluon Theory and Inconsistent Grounding
Beingg: Gluon Theory and Inconsistent Grounding
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Beingg:胶子理论和不一致的基础
DOI:
10.1080/09672559.2017.1352259
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发表时间:
2017
影响因子:
0.6
通讯作者:
Casati Filippo
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Casati Filippo
536 BOOK SYMPOSIUM into meaningful propositions and meaningful propositions are unified into a newspaper article. Right? How does this happen? Can two or more things be unified into one single object? Is there something that makes these parts a unity? Since the beginning of Western thought, philosophers have tried to answer these kinds of questions. Nevertheless, after more than two thousand years, the concept of unity still remains an open problem. Let’s see why. Consider an object o, which has only two parts (call them a and b). In order to obtain object o, we could insert something in the gap between a and b, which unifies them. Following Priest (2014a), we call this third element a gluon (g). Nevertheless, if g is different from a and b, we need to insert another gluon (let’s say g1) in the gap between a and g and in the gap between b and g. It is easy to see that, if we always insert a new element between the parts of the object o and the gaps between them, we end up in a vicious infinite regress of gluons, hyper-gluons (g1), hyper-hyper-gluon (g2) and so on.Graham Priest, in his One, defends a theory which aims to explain the unity of objects avoiding such a problematic infinite regress. According to his theory, the gluon, g, of an object, o, is ‘identical to all and only the parts of the object’o (Priest 2014a, 20). Since, according to our example, object o has two parts (a and b), the gluon g of o is identical to a and it is identical to b. For this reason, since g is identical to a and g is identical to b, there is no gap between the parts of object o and the element that unifies them (g). No gap needs to be filled. The infinite regress is blocked.