International Constraints and Electoral Decisions: Does the Room to Maneuver Attenuate Economic Voting?
International Constraints and Electoral Decisions: Does the Room to Maneuver Attenuate Economic Voting?
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国际约束和选举决定：回旋余地是否会削弱经济投票？
DOI：
10.1111/ajps.12362
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Spyros Kosmidis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Spyros Kosmidis
关于选举责任和经济投票的重要研究表明，政府约束和国际金融结构会减少经济投票。拟议的机制通常被称为“回旋余地”，它认为，由于民选官员提出和实施经济政策的空间有限，政治家可以逃避责任，因此选民不太可能对经济施加投票权重。然而，大衰退期间欧洲举行的选举结果以及对这些选举中经济投票的学术研究使人们对因果机制产生了严重怀疑。本文利用希腊（受债务危机影响最严重的国家）的数据，通过调查实验直接检验了这一机制。结果表明，尽管经济投票是强大且实质性的，但其规模在不同的回旋余地治疗方案中并没有变化。这一发现为有关经济投票的文献提供了信息，并对政党在外生政策实施及其选举影响方面的策略产生了重要影响。
Prominent studies of electoral accountability and economic voting suggest that government constraints and international financial structures decrease the economic vote. The proposed mechanism is often labelled as the Room to Maneuver and it posits that because elected officials have limited space to propose and implement economic policy, politicians can shirk responsibility, and thus voters are less likely to place voting weights on the economy. However, results from elections that took place in Europe during the Great Recession and scholarly research on economic voting in these elections cast serious doubts on the causal mechanism. This paper directly tests this mechanism with a survey experiment using data from Greece (the country most affected by the debt crisis). The results suggest that, although the economic vote is strong and substantive, its size does not vary across the Room to Maneuver treatments. This finding informs the literature on economic voting and carries out important implications for party strategies with respect to exogenous policy impositions and their electoral effects.
影响因子：
3.9
作者：
Hobolt S
通讯作者：
Hobolt S