A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies
A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument Fallacies
复制标题
解决非正式论证谬误的贝叶斯方法
作者：
U. Hahn;M. Oaksford
我们详细考察了三个经典的推理谬误，即所谓的“不正确”的论证形式。这就是所谓的愚昧之辩、循环之辩或请愿之理、滑坡式之辩。在每种情况下，参数类型都显示为与被广泛接受的结构参数相匹配。这表明，争论的形式本身并不是有问题的，而是那些例子的内容有问题，这些例子通常是有理由的。这导致了对这些经典论证形式的贝叶斯重新分析，并对它们构成或不构成合法论证形式的条件进行了重新表述。
We examine in detail three classic reasoning fallacies, that is, supposedly ``incorrect' forms of argument. These are the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument. In each case, the argument type is shown to match structurally arguments which are widely accepted. This suggests that it is not the form of the arguments as such that is problematic but rather something about the content of those examples with which they are typically justified. This leads to a Bayesian reanalysis of these classic argument forms and a reformulation of the conditions under which they do or do not constitute legitimate forms of argumentation.