High Discounts and High Unemployment
High Discounts and High Unemployment
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高折扣和高失业率
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20141297
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Hall
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Hall
在经济衰退期间，所有类型的投资都会下降，包括雇主在创造就业方面的投资。股票市场的跌幅超过了公司利润的比例。股票市场隐含的贴现率上升，对业务收入的其他债权的贴现也上升。根据主要的失业观点--戴蒙德-莫滕森-皮萨里德斯模型--当创造就业的动力下降时，劳动力市场就会疲软，失业率就会上升。雇主通过从雇佣关系中收取一部分盈余来收回他们在创造就业方面的投资。当贴现率上升时，这一流量的价值就会下降。因此，高贴现率意味着高失业率。这篇论文没有解释为什么贴现率在经济衰退中上升如此之多。相反，它表明，在一个由于某种原因，经济衰退期间贴现率大幅上升的经济体中，失业率的上升在经济上是完全合理的。
In recessions, all types of investment fall, including employers' investment in job creation. The stock market falls more than in proportion to corporate profit. The discount rate implicit in the stock market rises, and discounts for other claims on business income also rise. According to the leading view of unemployment-the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model-when the incentive for job creation falls, the labor market slackens and unemployment rises. Employers recover their investments in job creation by collecting a share of the surplus from the employment relationship. The value of that flow falls when the discount rate rises. Thus high discount rates imply high unemployment. This paper does not explain why the discount rate rises so much in recessions. Rather, it shows that the rise in unemployment makes perfect economic sense in an economy where, for some reason, the discount rises substantially in recessions.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Campbell, John Y.;Shiller, Robert J.
通讯作者：
Shiller, Robert J.