Product Differentiation, Strategic Divisionalization, and Persistence of Monopoly
Product Differentiation, Strategic Divisionalization, and Persistence of Monopoly
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产品差异化、战略分工化和垄断持续存在
DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00581.x
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Lasheng Yuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lasheng Yuan
本文分析了产品差异化时寡头垄断企业建立自主竞争部门的战略动机。我们考虑了一个两阶段博弈，其中企业在第一阶段选择自治部门的数量，所有部门在第二阶段参与古诺竞争。研究表明，产品差异化保证了内部子博弈完美纳什均衡(SPNE)的存在，均衡分割数随产品间的替代度和企业数量的增加而增加。此外，如果允许进一步分割，它们总是会这样做，这将导致总的租金消散。因此，母公司有动机单方面限制其部门进一步分裂。在自由进入均衡中，研究发现，设立自治区划的可能性是进入的天然壁垒。现任者可能会持续赚取异常高的利润。在产品差异化困难的情况下，即使进入成本相对较低，唯一的纯策略自由进入的特殊目的企业也是垄断结果。版权所有(C)1999麻省理工学院。
This paper analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two-stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to divide further, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free-entry equilibrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure-strategy free-entry SPNE is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low. Copyright (c) 1999 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.