Foreign Entry and Bank Competition
Foreign Entry and Bank Competition
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.04.002
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
Rajdeep Sengupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rajdeep Sengupta
外资进入和银行竞争被建模为信息不对称的委托人之间的互动：进入者将抵押品作为一种筛选手段，以竞争现任者的信息优势。事前更好的信息和事后更有力的法律保护都表明，有利于低成本的外部竞争对手进入信贷市场。进入者通过提供更便宜的贷款获得更高质量的借款人的成功，随着其效率(成本)优势的增加而增加。这篇论文提供的证据表明，外国银行倾向于向大公司提供更多贷款，从而忽视了中小企业。研究结果还解释了为什么这种观察到的偏向在新兴市场更为强烈。
Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: The entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by offering cheaper loans increases with its efficiency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large firms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results also explain why this observed bias is stronger in emerging markets.