THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN RESOLVING COMMON DILEMMAS - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE WITH HETEROGENEOUS APPROPRIATORS
THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN RESOLVING COMMON DILEMMAS - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE WITH HETEROGENEOUS APPROPRIATORS
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DOI：
10.1006/jeem.1994.1029
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发表时间：
1994-09-01
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
WALKER, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
HACKETT, S;SCHLAGER, E;WALKER, J
通信已被证明是促进在同类共用资源环境中有效利用资源的一种有效机制。沟通使划拨人有机会就总体拨款目标达成一致，并就选择投入分配规则进行协调。当拨款者相同时，这些规则产生相同的投入分配，从而促进合作。我们考察了在拨款者投入天赋不同的情况下，沟通作为一种提高效率的机制的稳健性。这种异构性造成了对公共池资源访问的分配冲突。这种冲突可能会导致自治失败。我们提出了一系列实验的结果，其中异质捐赠被分配：(1)随机，拨款者拥有完全信息；(2)通过拍卖，拨款者拥有完全信息；(3)随机，拨款者拥有不完全和不对称的信息。这些发现与CPR领域设置的规则进行了对比。(C)1994年学术出版社。
Communication has been shown to be an effective mechanism for promoting efficient resource use in homogeneous common-pool resource settings. Communication allows appropriators the opportunity to agree on an aggregate appropriation target and coordinate over the selection of input allocation rules. When appropriators are identical, these rules result in identical input allocations, which facilitates cooperation. We examine the robustness of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism in settings where appropriators differ in input endowments. This heterogeneity creates a distributional conflict over access to common-pool resources. This conflict can cause self-governance to fail. We present findings from a series of experiments where heterogeneous endowments are assigned: (1) randomly, and appropriators have complete information, (2) through an auction, and appropriators have complete information, and (3) randomly, and appropriators have incomplete and asymmetric information. These findings are contrasted with rules from CPR field settings. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.