Block Ciphers Sensitive to Gröbner Basis Attacks
Block Ciphers Sensitive to Gröbner Basis Attacks
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DOI：
10.1007/11605805_20
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发表时间：
2006-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Buchmann;A. Pyshkin;R. Weinmann
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文献类型：
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作者：
J. Buchmann;A. Pyshkin;R. Weinmann
We construct and analyze Feistel and SPN ciphers that have a sound design strategy against linear and differential attacks but for which the encryption process can be described by very simple polynomial equations. For a block and key size of 128 bits, we present ciphers for which practical Gröbner basis attacks can recover the full cipher key requiring only a minimal number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We show how Gröbner bases for a subset of these ciphers can be constructed with neglegible computational effort. This reduces the key–recovery problem to a Gröbner basis conversion problem. By bounding the running time of a Gröbner basis conversion algorithm, FGLM, we demonstrate the existence of block ciphers resistant against differential and linear cryptanalysis but vulnerable against Gröbner basis attacks.
