HOW HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECTS HEALTH CARE DEMANDA STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION
HOW HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECTS HEALTH CARE DEMANDA STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00457.x
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发表时间：
2013-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Dong, Yingying
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dong, Yingying
有健康保险的人使用更多的医疗保健。原因之一是医疗保健对投保人来说更便宜。此外，拥有保险可以通过道德风险鼓励不健康的行为。以往研究健康保险对医疗利用的影响的工作大多忽略了由于拥有健康保险而引起的行为变化，以及这反过来如何影响医疗利用。本文从理论和实证两方面研究了健康保险状况、健康行为和医疗利用之间的结构性因果关系，并将价格效应与行为道德风险效应区分开来。保险对行为影响的广度边际与深度边际也有区别。(JEL C51、I12、D12）
Individuals with health insurance use more health care. One reason is that health care is cheaper for the insured. Additionally, having insurance can encourage unhealthy behavior via moral hazard. Previous work studying the effect of health insurance on medical utilization has mostly ignored behavioral changes due to having health insurance, and how that in turn affects medical utilization. This paper investigates the structural causal relationships among health insurance status, health behavior, and medical utilization theoretically and empirically, and separates price effects from behavioral moral hazard effects. Also distinguished are the extensive versus intensive margins of insurance effects on behavior. (JEL C51, I12, D12)