PRIVATISED TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND INCENTIVES TO INVEST
PRIVATISED TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND INCENTIVES TO INVEST
复制标题
私有化交通基础设施和投资激励措施
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1991
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
David D. Thompson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Helm;David D. Thompson
人们经常断言，英国的公有制导致了对产能的过度投资。Rees（1989）认为，这“也许是政府控制公共企业制度的最大单一失败，至少到1980年代初是这样”。相反，也有人断言，私有化的公用事业几乎没有什么激励措施来进行有效投资。如果允许这些公司在私有化后遵循利润最大化的政策，这一结果就不足为奇了。垄断企业（尤其是自然垄断企业）通过压缩产能利润率来实现利润最大化。但实际上，所有权变更的后果更为复杂。私有化基本上取代了通过国有制进行的监管，取而代之的是通过许可证进行的监管。每一个新私有化的公用事业公司都获得许可证，允许它提供垄断服务，以换取与定价明确有关的承诺，在某些情况下，还包括服务质量。这些实际上是公司与社区之间的合同，由监管机构进行监督和仲裁。因此，私有化是否会导致有效的投资水平，取决于企业战略与这些监管约束之间的相互作用。
It has often been asserted that public ownership in the UK resulted in over investment in capacity. Rees (1989) considers that this is "perhaps the greatest single failure of the system of government control of public enterprise, at least up to the early 1980s". Conversely it has also been asserted that privatised utilities face few incentives to invest efficiently. This would hardly be a surprising result if the firms were allowed to follow profit maximising policies after privatisation. Monopolies (and especially natural monopolies) maximise profits by tightening capacity margins. In practice, however, the consequences of changes of ownership have been more complex. Privatisation has, in the main, replaced regulation through state ownership by regulation through licences. Each newly privatised utility has been granted a licence which entitles it to supply monopoly services in return for undertakings related explicitly to pricing, and, in some cases, service quality. These are in effect contracts between the firm and the community, monitored and arbitrated upon by a regulator. Whether privatisation results in efficient levels of investment thus depends upon the interaction between the firm's strategies and these regulatory constraints.