On the Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation
On the Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation
复制标题
论股票补偿的效率
DOI：
10.1093/rfs/5.3.471
复制
发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
J. Paul
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Paul
当市场能够以同样的精度观察所有项目的盈利能力时，那么在股票薪酬的情况下：（1）任何给定项目在管理薪酬中的权重与该项目努力的边际生产率无关;（2）作为管理努力最具噪声指标的项目在薪酬中获得最大权重;（3）投资者有最大的动机去收集项目的信息，这些信息是管理努力的最具噪音的指标。牛津大学出版社代表金融研究学会在其期刊《金融研究评论》上发表的文章。
When the market can observe the profitability of all projects with equal precision, then with stock compensation (1) the weight on any given project in managerial compensation is independent of the marginal productivity of effort in the project; (2) the projects that are the noisiest indicators of managerial effort receive the most weight in compensation; and (3) investors have the greatest incentive to collect information about projects that are the noisiest indicators of managerial effort. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.