The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs.
The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs.
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.113.2.409
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发表时间：
2006-04
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Hertwig R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brandstätter E;Gigerenzer G;Hertwig R
伯努利的预期效用框架可以作为各种心理过程的模型，包括动机，道德感，态度和决策。为了解释与预期效用不一致的证据，我们将快速和节俭的推理框架推广到偏好。优先级启发式预测（i）阿莱悖论，（ii）风险规避收益，如果概率高，（iii）风险寻求收益，如果概率低（彩票），（iv）风险规避损失，如果概率低（购买保险），（v）风险寻求损失，如果概率高，（vi）确定性效应，（vii）可能性效应，和（viii）不传递性。我们测试如何准确的启发式预测人们的选择，相比以前提出的启发式和预期效用理论的三个修改：安全潜力/愿望理论，转移注意力交换模型，和累积前景理论。
Bernoulli's framework of expected utility serves as a model for various psychological processes, including motivation, moral sense, attitudes, and decision making. To account for evidence at variance with expected utility, we generalize the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences. The priority heuristic predicts (i) Allais' paradox, (ii) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (iii) risk seeking for gains if probabilities are low (lottery tickets), (iv) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low (buying insurance), (v) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, (vi) certainty effect, (vii) possibility effect, and (viii) intransitivities. We test how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices, compared to previously proposed heuristics and three modifications of expected utility theory: security-potential/aspiration theory, transfer-of-attention-exchange model, and cumulative prospect theory.