Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics
Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics
复制标题
基于主体的美德伦理
DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-4975.1995.tb00306.x
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Slote
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Slote
基于代理人的美德伦理学已经存在很长一段时间了，但它的实践者通常不知道这种方法与其他形式的美德伦理学有何不同，而今天，当我们对这些事情更加自觉时，基于代理人的美德伦理学在美德伦理学领域明显处于少数地位。圣奥古斯丁、孟子、尼采和世纪末的伦理学家詹姆斯·马蒂诺都是基于行动者的美德伦理学家，任何这样的方法都与当今流行的美德伦理学形式（如新亚里士多德主义）有着重要的区别。然而，为了把这一点弄清楚，我将首先描述什么是基于主体的，以及刚才提到的历史人物是如何以其他值得注意的美德伦理学家所没有的方式来描述基于主体的。此后，我将谈谈对基于主体的观点的一些批评，描述如何解决这些批评，并继续简要解释我如何以及为什么认为基于主体的观点可能是当代美德伦理学最有前途的方法。
Agent-based virtue ethics has been around for a very long time, but its practitioners have typically been unaware of how this approach differs from other forms of virtue ethics, and today, when we are more self-conscious about such things, agent-basing is a distinctly minority position in the field of virtue ethics. St. Augustine, Mencius, Nietzsche, and the late-nineteenth-century ethicist James Martineau were all agent-based virtue ethicists, and there are important differences between any such approach and popular present-day forms of virtue ethics like neo-Aristotelianism. To make this clear, however, I will first describe what agent-basing is and how the historical figures just mentioned exemplify agent-basing in a way that other noteworthy virtue ethicists do not. Thereafter, I shall speak about some criticisms that can be made of agent-based views, describe how those criticisms can be addressed, and go on to briefly explain how and why I think agent-basing is probably the most promising approach for contemporary virtue ethics.