Truncated differential cryptanalysis of five rounds of Salsa20
Truncated differential cryptanalysis of five rounds of Salsa20
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发表时间:
2005
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通讯作者:
Paul Crowley
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作者:
Paul Crowley
We present an attack on Salsa20 reduced to five of its twenty rounds. This attack uses many clusters of truncated differentials and requires 2 work and 2 plaintexts. 1 Definition of Salsa20 Salsa20 [1] is a candidate in the eSTREAM project to identify new stream ciphers that might be suitable for widespread adoption. For convenience, we recap here the parameterized family of variants Salsa20-w/r, with w the word size and r the number of rounds; Salsa20 itself is Salsa20-32/20. A word is an element of Z/2wZ. We omit the precise definitions of word-oriented operations here for brevity; addition (+), XOR (⊕) and rotation (≪) are defined in the usual way, and where words are mapped to bytes, a little-endian mapping is used. We define a bijective map S on four-element column vectors of words: Sa(( y0 y1 y2 y3 ) ) = ( y1 ⊕ ((y0 + y3) ≪ a) y2 y3 y0 ) and compose it four times to build this bijective map on the same: Q = S18 ◦ S13 ◦ S9 ◦ S7 (note that the constants given in the subscripts are appropriate for w = 32; different constants might be used for a different w) and compose it with a row and column rotate to get this bijective map on matrices: Q′(m) = m1,1 m1,2 m1,3 q1 m2,1 m2,2 m2,3 q2 m3,1 m3,2 m3,3 q3 m0,1 m0,2 m0,3 q0 ∗paul@ciphergoth.org. Work sponsored by LShift Ltd, www.lshift.net