Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve Coordination Failure: A Quasi-Field Experiment in India's Manufacturing Sector
Using Social Connections and Financial Incentives to Solve Coordination Failure: A Quasi-Field Experiment in India's Manufacturing Sector
复制标题
利用社会联系和经济激励来解决协调失败：印度制造业的准现场实验
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102445
复制
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Swati Sharma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Farzana Afridi;A. Dhillon;S. Li;Swati Sharma
生产过程通常以团队形式组织，但关于社会关系和经济激励是否以及如何影响需要工人之间协调的任务的生产力的证据有限。我们在现场实验室实验中模拟了装配线生产，在该实验中，工人在团队中的最小努力游戏中发挥真正的努力，这些团队的成员要么有社会联系，要么没有社会联系，并根据小组产出获得报酬。我们发现，当员工与同事建立社交联系时，团队产出会增加 18%，协调性会提高 30-39%。这些发现似乎可以用社交团队中同事之间更高水平的亲社会动机来解释。
Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output increases by 18%, and coordination improves by 30–39% when workers are socially connected with their co-workers. These findings can plausibly be explained by the higher levels of pro-social motivation between co-workers in socially connected teams.