Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure
Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure
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DOI：
10.1007/s40505-023-00242-w
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发表时间：
2023-03
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
Ken Urai;Hiromi Murakami;Weiye Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ken Urai;Hiromi Murakami;Weiye Chen
我们将Ichiishi(Economrica 49(2)：369-377)的社会联盟均衡概念推广到带参数的多层联盟结构，其中代理可以同时合并多个具有多个独立联盟偏离机会的联盟结构。对于每个机会，代理人都会进行一场社会联盟均衡博弈，称为次参数姐妹博弈，受外部环境(参数和所有其他次参数姐妹博弈的联合决策)的约束。因此，广义社会联盟均衡概念被认为是纳什均衡概念和合作解概念的综合。给出了GSCE的定义，并给出了存在定理的证明。通过对一般均衡模型的一些应用，GSCE概念为描述具有独立投资机会的共存不同产业及其同时决定的产业组织提供了一个概念框架。
We generalize the notion of Ichiishi (Econometrica 49(2):369–377, )’ssocial coalitional equilibriumto amulti-layered coalition structurewithparameters, in which agents can incorporate simultaneously multiple coalition structures with multiple independent coalition-deviation opportunities. For each opportunity, agents play a social coalitional equilibrium (SCE) game, called asub-parametric SCE game, constrained by external environment (parameters and joint decisions of all other sub-parametric SCE games). The generalized social coalitional equilibrium (GSCE) concept is, therefore, considered to be a synthesis of the Nash equilibrium concept and the cooperative solution concept. We provide the definition of GSCE and give the proof of existence theorem. Through some applications to general equilibrium models, the GSCE concept provides a conceptual framework for describing coexisting different industries having independent investment opportunities and their simultaneously determinedindustrial organizations.