A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
复制标题
序贯平衡的改进
作者：
In
本文推广了Cho和D. M. Kreps（1987年）。限制是信念不能给可以通过基于作为常识的可用数据的合理内省排除的观点赋予正权重。为了证明前向诱导平衡点的存在性，本文提出了一种新的方法，它包括两个步骤。首先利用E. Kohlberg和J.F. Mertens（1986年）。证明了前向诱导均衡对应在结果空间中是上半连续的，且对应于博弈参数的变化。版权所有1987年由计量经济学会。
The author proposes a refinement of seq uential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing a restri ction proposed for signaling games in Cho and D. M. Kreps (1987). The restriction is that beliefs must not assign positive weight to the p ossibilities that can be excluded through reasonable introspection ba sed on the data available as common knowledge. A new technique is dev eloped in order to prove the existence of forward induction equilibri um, which consists of two steps. First, the author establishes the ge neric existence of forward induction equilibrium by exploiting the re sults of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). Then, he shows that th e forward induction equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuou s in the outcome space with respect to the changes of parameters of t he game. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.