Optimal-Rate Non-Committing Encryption in a CRS Model
Optimal-Rate Non-Committing Encryption in a CRS Model
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发表时间：
2016
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通讯作者：
R. Canetti;Oxana Poburinnaya;Mariana Raykova
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作者：
R. Canetti;Oxana Poburinnaya;Mariana Raykova
当数据擦除不值得信赖的情况下，非委托加密（NCE）在自适应校正下实现安全通道。在初始构造中（例如Canetti，Feige，Goldreich和Naor，STOC 96）接收器消息的长度，即公共密钥和发件人消息，即Ciphertext是M·Poly（λ）对于M-BIT消息，其中λ是后续的工作，可以显着提高效率，从而实现率poly log（λ）。 1+ O（1），与普通语义上的加密速率相当。多项式数量M-BIT消息。此外，这是第一个具有完美的NCE协议。该协议自适应地取决于包含混淆程序的公共密钥或CR，同时仅假定混淆机制的标准（多项式）硬度。在其他地方有用。电视大学和波士顿大学。 1218461，NSF赠款1421102。‡oxanapob@bu.edu .Edu。
Non-committing encryption (NCE) implements secure channels under adaptive corruptions in situations when data erasures are not trustworthy. In this paper we are interested in the rate of NCE, i.e. in how many bits the sender and receiver need to send per plaintext bit. In initial constructions (e.g. Canetti, Feige, Goldreich and Naor, STOC 96) the length of both the receiver message, namely the public key, and the sender message, namely the ciphertext, is m · poly(λ) for an m-bit message, where λ is the security parameter. Subsequent works improve efficiency significantly, achieving rate poly log(λ). We construct the first constant-rate NCE. In fact, our scheme has rate 1+ o(1), which is comparable to the rate of plain semantically secure encryption. Our scheme operates in the common reference string (CRS) model. Our CRS has size poly(m · λ), but it is reusable for an arbitrary polynomial number of m-bit messages. In addition, it is the first NCE protocol with perfect correctness. We assume one way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits. As an essential step in our construction, we develop a technique for dealing with adversaries that modify the inputs to the protocol adaptively depending on a public key or CRS that contains obfuscated programs, while assuming only standard (polynomial) hardness of the obfuscation mechanism. This technique may well be useful elsewhere. ∗This work was done [in part] while the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, supported by the Simons Foundation and by the DIMACS/Simons Collaboration in Cryptography through NSF grant #CNS-1523467. †Tel-Aviv University and Boston University. canetti@bu.edu. Supported in addition by the Check Point Institute for Information Security and NSF Algorithmic Foundations grant 1218461, NSF grant 1421102. ‡Boston University. oxanapob@bu.edu. Supported in addition by the Check Point Institute for Information Security and NSF Algorithmic Foundations grant 1218461, NSF grant 1421102. §SRI, Yale University. mariana@cs.columbia.edu. Supported by NSF grant 1421102