Renegotiation in Repeated Games
Renegotiation in Repeated Games
复制标题
重复博弈中的重新谈判
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2395
复制
发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Debraj Ray
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Debraj Ray
福克定理给出的大量均衡引发了一个明显的问题：如果有“更好”的均衡，为什么参与者会“故意”选择结果不好的均衡？对此，一个简单的答案是，个人理性（沿着博弈常识和战略信念）并不会让我们走得比均衡行为更远。特别是，它不允许我们在集体理性的基础上在均衡中做出选择。
The huge multiplicity of equilibria given by the folk theorem motivates an obvious question: why would players “deliberately” select on equilibria with bad outcomes if “better” equilibria are available? A simple answer to this is that individual rationality (along with the common knowledge of the game and strategic beliefs) does not take us further than equilibrium behavior. In particular, it does not permit us to choose among equilibria on the basis of collective rationality.