Rescuing Doxastic Normativism
Rescuing Doxastic Normativism
复制标题
拯救信仰规范主义
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Olinder
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Olinder
根据道教的规范主义，使一种态度成为一种信仰而不是另一种态度的部分原因是，它受到真理规范的支配。有人反对说，这种观点不成立，因为有一些真实的命题，如果你相信它们，它们就不是真的，因此，相信真实命题的义务不适用于这些命题。我认为，鸽派正规主义者的解决方案是找到一种规范，正确区分我们必须相信的那些真实命题(“普通的非棘手的命题”)和我们不相信的那些(“棘手的命题”)。我发展了一种规范，我认为它就是这样做的，并进一步认为它可以用来挽救信仰是宪法规范的想法。
According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction between those true propositions we are obliged to believe (“ordinary non-tricky propositions”) and those we are not (“tricky propositions”). I develop a norm which I argue does exactly this, and further argue that it can be used to salvage the idea that belief is constitutively normative.