Objections to Bayesian statistics
Objections to Bayesian statistics
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DOI：
10.1214/08-ba318
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发表时间：
2008-01-01
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
Gelman, Andrew
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gelman, Andrew
贝叶斯推理是统计学中比较有争议的方法之一。对贝叶斯方法的基本反对有两个方面：一方面，贝叶斯方法是作为一个自动推理引擎提出的，这引起了任何有应用经验的人的怀疑。对贝叶斯的第二个反对意见来自相反的方向，并解决了贝叶斯推理的主观链。这篇文章提出了一系列反对贝叶斯推理的意见，以一个假设的反贝叶斯统计学家的声音写的。这篇文章的目的是引起阐述和扩展这些和其他参数从非贝叶斯和反应贝叶斯谁可能有不同的观点对这些问题。
Bayesian inference is one of the more controversial approaches to statistics. The fundamental objections to Bayesian methods are twofold: on one hand, Bayesian methods are presented as an automatic inference engine, and this raises suspicion in anyone with applied experience. The second objection to Bayes comes from the opposite direction and addresses the subjective strand of Bayesian inference. This article presents a series of objections to Bayesian inference, written in the voice of a hypothetical anti-Bayesian statistician. The article is intended to elicit elaborations and extensions of these and other arguments from non-Bayesians and responses from Bayesians who might have different perspectives on these issues.