Airline competition in a hub-dominated environment: An application of noncooperative game theory
Airline competition in a hub-dominated environment: An application of noncooperative game theory
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DOI：
10.1016/0191-2615(90)90030-3
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发表时间：
1990-02
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
M. Hansen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Hansen
建立了航空枢纽竞争模型，并将其应用于美国航空运输系统。枢纽竞争被描述为一组寻求利润最大化的航空公司之间的非合作博弈。航空公司的竞争对手有两种类型：枢纽航空公司，可以通过枢纽提供任何两个点之间的连接服务，以及直接服务到枢纽当地的市场；直航航空公司，可以在任何市场提供点对点服务。该模型通过一组假设来实现，这些假设将每一家航空公司的决策变量减少到其服务频率集。使用旅客路线选择、平均票价和航空公司成本的模型来建立航空公司利润函数，其变元是这些频率。在给定竞争航空公司的频率的情况下，使用数值方法来确定每家航空公司的利润最大化频率。逐次优化被用来识别准平衡状态。该模型使用1985年的成本、票价和需求数据应用于美国。研究发现，在许多关键系统变量方面，如乘客使用转机服务的比例，以及大多数最大枢纽的活动水平，准平衡状态与实际系统相似。另一方面，在一些系统变量和两类枢纽的活动水平方面存在很大差异：位于多机场区域的枢纽和当地市场相对较弱的枢纽。有必要进行更多的研究来解释这些差异，以及放松在制定中心竞争游戏时使用的一些简化假设。
A model of airline hub competition is developed and applied to the United States air transportation system. Hub competition is portrayed as ann-player, noncooperative game between a set of airlines seeking to maximize profit. Airline competitors are of two types: hub carriers, who can offer connecting service between any two points through their hub as well as direct service to markets local to their hub; and direct carriers, who can offer point-to-point service in any market. The model is operationalized through a set of assumptions that reduce the decision variables of each airline to its set of service frequencies. Models of passenger route choice, average fare, and airline cost are used to develop airline profit functions whose arguments are these frequencies. Numerical methods are used to identify profit-maximizing frequencies for each airline, given the frequencies of the competing airlines. Successive optimizations are used to identify states of quasi-equilibria. The model was applied to the United States using 1985 cost, fare, and demand data. The quasi-equilibrium state was found to resemble the actual system with regard to a number of key system variables, such as the proportion of passengers using connecting service, and with regard to activity levels at most of the largest hubs. On the other hand, there were substantial divergences with respect to some system variables, and with respect to the levels of activity at hubs of two types: those located in multi-airport regions, and those with comparatively weak local markets. Additional research is necessary to explain these differences, as well as to relax some the simplifying assumptions used in the formulation of the hub competition game.