From the Critique of Judgment to the Principle of the Open Question
From the Critique of Judgment to the Principle of the Open Question
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从判断力批判到开放性问题原则
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发表时间：
2015
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通讯作者：
Gesa Lindemann
中科院分区：
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作者：
Gesa Lindemann
康德的相关性，以普雷斯纳的工作是长期以来，但忽视和几乎没有任何提到普雷斯纳在康德文学。然而，1990年代开始的普莱西纳复兴，使人们更加关注他的理论的方法论构建，因此康德的联系至少得到了承认，但康德的《判断力批判》（康德1790/2007）的特殊相关性尚未得到系统的阐述。在这篇文章中，我探讨了康德的反思的概念之间的联系，具体的目的判断和普莱斯纳的理论。我开始阐述目的论判断的特征，其中有两点特别重要：终极原因的时间结构和康德提到的不同于人类的理解，即不同于人类的秩序力量。在第二步中，我工作出Plessner的概念化的时空外观的生物体和他理解的方式，其他的人类理解为自然的或历史的历史演变和可变的自我秩序的能力。他得出这些结论的方式方法论控制的过程中提出的问题来自康德，他称之为“原则的开放问题。”
The relevance of Kant to Plessner’s work was long all but ignored and there is hardly any mention of Plessner in the Kant literature. The Plessner renaissance beginning in the 1990s, however, has brought with it a stronger focus on the methodological construction of his theory, so that the Kant connection has at least been acknowledged, but the particular relevance of Kant’s Critique of Judgement (Kant 1790/2007) has not been systematically explicated. In this essay, I investigate the connection between Kant’s notion of reflective—specifically teleological—judgment and Plessner’s theory. I begin by setting out the characteristics of teleological judgment, with two points being of particular importance: the temporal structure of the final cause and Kant’s reference to an understanding other than the human, that is, to an ordering power other than the human. In a second step, I work out Plessner’s conceptualization of the spatiotemporal appearance of organisms and the way he understands the other of human understanding as nature’s—or history’s—historically evolved and mutable capacity for self-order. He arrives at these conclusions by way of a methodologically controlled process of questioning derived from Kant, which he calls the “principle of the open question.”