Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
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描述错误信念的战略影响
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdw061
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Siyang Xiong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yi;Alfredo Di Tillio;E. Faingold;Siyang Xiong
先前的研究已经证实，博弈论的预测对玩家信念的假设相当敏感。我们通过描述模型基元上的条件来评估这个鲁棒性问题的严重性——参与者对收益相关参数的信念和高阶信念——给定的Harsanyi类型的行为被（一系列）扰动类型的行为所近似。这相当于提供Dekel等人（2006）的基于信念的战略拓扑特征。我们将我们的描述应用于关于高阶信念扰动的鲁棒性的各种问题，包括与共同先验一致的类型的一般性，并且我们研究了我们的鲁棒性概念与Monderer和Samet（1989）的共同p -信念概念之间的联系。
Previous research has established that the predictions of game theory are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players’ beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model—the players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters—for the behaviour of a given Harsanyi type to be approximated by the behaviour of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This amounts to providing belief-based characterizations of the strategic topologies of Dekel et al. (2006). We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions concerning robustness to perturbations of higher-order beliefs, including genericity of types that are consistent with a common prior, and we investigate the connections between our notions of robustness and the notion of common $p$-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989).