No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science
No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science
复制标题
现实主义无处可逃:选择性证实与科学史
DOI:
10.1086/377377
复制
发表时间:
2003
影响因子:
1.7
通讯作者:
P. Stanford
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
P. Stanford
Realists have responded to challenges from the historical record of successful but ultimately rejected theories with what I call the selective confirmation strategy: arguing that only idle parts of past theories have been rejected, while truly success‐generating features have been confirmed by further inquiry. I argue first, that this strategy is unconvincing without some prospectively applicable criterion of idleness for theoretical posits, and second, that existing efforts to provide one either convict all theoretical posits of idleness (Kitcher) or stand refuted by detailed consideration of the very examples (optical/electromagnetic ether, caloric fluid) to which they appeal (Psillos). I also argue that available avenues for improving on these proposals are unpromising.