Delusions and the background of rationality
Delusions and the background of rationality
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00282.x
复制
发表时间：
2005-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Bortolotti, L
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bortolotti, L
我认为，一些妄想案例表明，那些依赖于对信念归因的必要理性约束的解释理论是不充分的。我特别质疑这样一种观点，即非理性信念只能归因于理性的一般背景。受妄想影响的对象似乎是真正的信徒，他们的行为可以用有意的术语成功地解释，但他们不符合戴维森（1985a）所说的合理性背景需要满足的标准。
I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the background of rationality to be in place.