Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Scheme against Rational Adversaries
Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Scheme against Rational Adversaries
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
Maiki Fujita;Takeshi Koshiba
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作者：
Maiki Fujita;Takeshi Koshiba
安全消息传输（SMT）是一种双方加密方案，通过该方案，发送方使用n个通道安全可靠地向接收方发送消息。假设攻击者破坏了n个信道中最多t个信道，并在破坏的信道上进行窃听或篡改。众所周知，如果t < n/2，那么信息论意义上的完美SMT（PSMT）是可以实现的，如果t ≥ n/2，那么不可能构造PSMT方案。如果我们被允许使用一个公共信道，除了正常的信道，我们可以实现几乎可靠的SMT（ARSMT），它允许传输失败的小概率，对t < n腐败。在密码学的标准设置中，参与者被分为诚实参与者和腐败参与者：每个诚实的参与者都遵守协议，而腐败参与者则被对手控制并进行恶意行为。作为一种真实的环境，博弈论中的理性概念经常被引入到密码学中。在本文中，我们首先考虑的“理性的对手”谁的行为根据自己的偏好在SMT。我们表明，它是可能的，以实现PSMT，甚至对任何t < n腐败在一些合理的设置下，理性的对手。
Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic scheme by which a sender securely and reliably sends messages to a receiver using n channels. Suppose that an adversary corrupts at most t out of n channels and makes eavesdropping or tampering over the corrupted channels. It is known that if t < n/2 then the perfect SMT (PSMT) in the information-theoretic sense is achievable and if t ≥ n/2 then no PSMT scheme is possible to construct. If we are allowed to use a public channel in addition to the normal channels, we can achieve the almost reliable SMT (ARSMT), which admits transmission failures of small probability, against t < n corruptions. In the standard setting in cryptography, the participants are classified into honest ones and corrupted ones: every honest participant follows the protocol but corrupted ones are controlled by the adversary and behave maliciously. As a real setting, the notion of rationality in the game theory is often incorporated into cryptography. In this paper, we first consider “rational adversary” who behaves according to his own preference in SMT. We show that it is possible to achieve PSMT even against any t < n corruptions under some reasonable settings for rational adversaries.