Compromise in Negotiation: Exploiting Worth Functions over States

Compromise in Negotiation: Exploiting Worth Functions over States
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谈判中的妥协:利用国家的价值函数

DOI:
10.1016/0004-3702(95)00037-2
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发表时间:
1996
期刊:
Artif. Intell.
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
J. Rosenschein
J. Rosenschein
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
Gilad Zlotkin;J. Rosenschein

文献摘要

被引文献

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以前的工作G。Zlotkin和J.S. Rosenschein(1989,1990,1991,1992)讨论了代理人之间的协商协议。其中一个主要的假设是,代理人的目标保持固定-代理人不能放松他们的初始目标,这只能作为一个整体实现,不能部分实现。一个目标被认为是一个公式,要么满足或不满足一个给定的国家。在这里,我们提出了一个更一般的方法,在非合作领域的代理人的目标是不表示为公式,而是作为价值函数的谈判问题。一个智能体将一个特定的值与每个可能的最终状态相关联;这个值反映了智能体从处于该状态中获得的满意度。在这种将目标定义为价值函数的新定义下,协议可能导致一个或两个目标仅部分实现的情况(即,代理可能无法达到其最期望的状态)。我们提出了一个协商协议,可用于一般的非合作域时,价值功能可用。这种多计划交易类型允许座席就其满意度进行妥协,并(同时)就将实施的联合计划进行协商,以达到妥协的最终状态。妥协的能力往往会带来更好的交易,使代理人能够提高他们的整体效用。最后,我们提出了更详细的例子,在各个领域的具体价值函数,并显示它们是如何在谈判过程中使用。
Previous work by G. Zlotkin and J.S. Rosenschein (1989, 1990, 1991, 1992) discussed interagent negotiation protocols. One of the main assumptions there was that the agents' goals remain fixed—the agents cannot relax their initial goals, which can be achieved only as a whole and cannot be partially achieved. A goal there was considered a formula that is either satisfied or not satisfied by a given state. We here present a more general approach to the negotiation problem in non-cooperative domains where agents' goals are not expressed as formulas, but rather as worth functions. An agent associates a particular value with each possible final state; this value reflects the degree of satisfaction the agent derives from being in that state. With this new definition of goal as worth function, an agreement may lead to a situation in which one or both goals are only partially achieved (i.e., agents may not reach their most desired state). We present a negotiation protocol that can be used in a general non-cooperative domain when worth functions are available. This multi-plan deal type allows agents to compromise over their degree of satisfaction, and (in parallel) to negotiate over the joint plan that will be implemented to reach the compromise final state. The ability to compromise often results in a better deal, enabling agents to increase their overall utility. Finally, we present more detailed examples of specific worth functions in various domains, and show how they are used in the negotiation process.