Endogenous timing and manufacturer advertising: A note
Endogenous timing and manufacturer advertising: A note
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DOI：
10.1111/meca.12321
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发表时间：
2020-10
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Qing Hu;Tomomichi Mizuno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Qing Hu;Tomomichi Mizuno
我们考虑一个垂直市场，由一家从事广告的制造商和两家提供差异化产品的零售商组成。我们分析了零售商的内生行动顺序，并证明他们可能会选择更具竞争性的环境：伯特兰竞争下的同步定价或古诺竞争下的顺序生产。即使我们将模型扩展到三级批发价格歧视和说服性广告，这个结果也是稳健的。
We consider a vertical market comprising of a manufacturer engaging in advertising and two retailers offering differentiated products. We analyze the endogenous order of moves for the retailers and demonstrate that they may choose a more competitive environment: simultaneous pricing under Bertrand competition or sequential producing under Cournot competition. This result is robust even if we extended our model to third‐degree wholesale price discrimination and persuasive advertising.