A strategic calculus of voting
A strategic calculus of voting
复制标题
投票的战略计算
DOI：
10.1007/bf00124048
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发表时间：
1983
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. Rosenthal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Palfrey;H. Rosenthal
结论有几个主要的见解，这种博弈论分析产生了。第一，我们已经证明，即使多数票远远大于少数票，而且投票成本非常高，均衡也存在。例如，在使用现状规则的大选民中，当成本几乎等于奖励（B）的37%（e-1× 100）时，我们展示了投票率大致等于少数人数两倍的混合纯均衡。第二，在选民人数较多的情况下，许多均衡似乎只剩下两种类型，一种是刚才提到的类型，另一种是几乎没有投票率的类型。第三，我们已经表明，投票率可能会随着投票成本的上升而上升。当团队的所有成员“调整”他们的投票率概率时，结果是关键的概率增加，以匹配增加的投票成本。我们还表明，在投票率概率接近1或0的大选民中，投票率几乎不随成本而变化。第四，选票的实际分配很可能是对选民实际偏好分配的一种有偏见的衡量。因为多数人有更大的动机搭便车，他们将比少数人少。选举可能会相对接近，即使一个备选方案得到绝大多数选民的支持。多数派获胜的可能性似乎与选民的规模或其相对于少数派的规模没有密切关系。然而，投票率与少数人和多数人的相对规模密切相关。
ConclusionThere are several major insights which this game theoretic analysis has produced. First, we have shown that equilibria exist with substantial turnout even when both the majority is much larger than the minority and the costs of voting are exceptionally high. For example, in large electorates using the status quo rule, we show mixed-pure equilibria with turnout roughly equal to twice the size of the minority when the cost is nearly equal to 37% (e−1× 100) of the reward (B). Second, with large electorates the many equilibria appear to reduce to just two types, the type just mentioned and a type with almost no turnout. Third, we have shown that turnout may rise as the costs of voting rise. This results when all members of a team “adjust” their turnout probabilities so that the probability of being pivotal increases to match the increased cost of voting. We have also shown that turnout is nearly invariant with costs in large electorates where turnout probabilities approach one or zero. Fourth, the actual split of the vote is likely to be a biased measure of the actual distribution of preferences in the electorate. Because majorities have greater incentives to free-ride, they will turn out less heavily than minorities. Elections can be relatively close, even when one alternative is supported by a substantial majority of the electorate. The probability that the majority will win does not seem to be closely related to the size of the electorate or its size relative to the minority. However, turnout is quite strongly correlated with the relative sizes of the minority and the majority.