The dynamics of government
The dynamics of government
复制标题
政府动态
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.08.012
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Fabrizio Zilibotti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
John Hassler;Per Krusell;Kjetil Storesletten;Fabrizio Zilibotti
我们的收入再分配模型的动态扭曲所确定的理性投票，而不承诺之间的个人不同类型和收入的实现。我们发现，再分配是过于持久的相对于计划者选择的承诺。差异越大，年轻代理人的政治影响力越低，对后代的利他关怀越低，风险规避越低。此外，在政治均衡中往往存在过多的再分配。最后，平滑偏好聚合，如概率投票，产生较少的持久性，不承认多重均衡，发生在多数投票聚合。
We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations. We find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment. The difference is larger, the lower is the political influence of young agents, the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations, and the lower is risk-aversion. Furthermore, there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium. Finally, smooth preference aggregation, as under probabilistic voting, produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria, which occur under majority-voting aggregation.