Political incentives and local government spending multiplier: Evidence for Chinese provinces (1978–2016)
Political incentives and local government spending multiplier: Evidence for Chinese provinces (1978–2016)
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DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2019.07.006
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发表时间：
2020-05
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Wen Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wen Zhang
本文使用中国各省的数据来检验后经济改革时期省级领导人的政治激励对地方政府支出乘数的影响。基于局部投影方法的估计提供了三个新的发现。第一，估计的累积相对政府开支乘数远高于1，而且在1994年以后的时期比1994年以前更大。第二，省级领导人的政治激励增强了地方政府支出乘数，并且在1994年后效果非常显著。第三，1994年以后，经济繁荣加强了政治激励的增强效应。
This paper uses data from Chinese provinces to examine the effects of political incentives of provincial leaders on local government spending multipliers over the post-economic-reform period. The estimation based on the local projection method provides three novel findings. Firstly, the estimated cumulative relative government spending multiplier is well above unity, and it is greater in the period after 1994 compared with before 1994. Secondly, the political incentives of provincial leaders augment the local government spending multipliers, and the effects are highly significant after 1994. Thirdly, the economic boom strengthens the augmenting effects of political incentives after 1994.