BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR CONTINUOUS ZERO{SUM GAMES
BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR CONTINUOUS ZERO{SUM GAMES
复制标题
连续零和博弈的最佳反应动力学
DOI:
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发表时间:
2005
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
S. Sorin
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
J. Hofbauer;S. Sorin
We study best response dynamics in continuous
time for continuous concave-convex
zero-sum games and prove convergence of its trajectories to the
set of saddle points, thus providing a dynamical proof of the minmax theorem.
Consequences for the corresponding
discrete time process with small or diminishing step-sizes
are established, including convergence of the fictitious play
procedure.