Obviousness around the clock
Obviousness around the clock
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全天候清晰
DOI：
10.1007/s10683-021-09720-z
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Sebastian Schweighofer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yves Breitmoser;Sebastian Schweighofer
Li（Am Econ Rev 107（11）：3257-3287，2017）介绍了显性策略的明显性的理论概念，用作机制设计的细化。这一概念得到了实验证据的支持，即在动态上升时钟拍卖中，出价比静态第二价格拍卖（私人价值）更接近于支配地位，并指出支配地位在前者中理论上是明显的，但在后者中不是。我们复制了他的实验研究，并添加了三种中间拍卖形式，这些拍卖形式分解了设计的差异，以量化（1）简单地看到一个价格上升的时钟（在投标提交后），（2）在时钟上动态投标，（3）获得（理论上无关）关于其他投标人的退出信息的累积效应。该理论预测，通过（2）动态投标，优势变得明显。然而，我们发现（2）没有显著的行为效应，而反馈效应（1）和（3）非常显著。我们的结论是，第二价格和上升时钟拍卖之间的行为差异提供了相当有限的支持，显而易见的理论和框架有惊人的巨大潜力，在机制设计。
Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the static second-price auction (private values), noting that dominance is theoretically obvious in the former but not the latter. We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats that decompose the designs’ differences to quantify the cumulative effects of (1) simply seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock, and (3) getting (theoretically irrelevant) drop-out information about other bidders. The theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2), dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2), however, while the feedback effects (1) and (3) are highly significant. We conclude that behavioral differences between second-price and ascending-clock auctions offer rather limited support for the theory of obviousness and that framing has surprisingly large potential in mechanism design.