The dual nature of technical artifacts : presentation of a new research programme

The dual nature of technical artifacts : presentation of a new research programme
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技术制品的双重性:新研究计划的呈现

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发表时间:
2002
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通讯作者:
A. Meijers
A. Meijers
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作者:
P. Kroes;A. Meijers

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在我们的思考、说话和行动中,我们使用两种基本的世界概念。一方面,我们认为世界是由通过因果关系相互作用的物理对象组成的。另一方面,我们认为它是由代理人(主要是人类)组成的,他们有意地代表世界并在其中行动。自然科学的巨大成功向许多人表明,物理或物质概念化适用于经验可及的宇宙的每一部分,包括人类。然而,这一观点给有意概念化带来了严重的问题。它表明,精神状态在人类行为中是无效的,或者相反,人类行为是由精神状态和大脑状态因果过度决定的。如今,心灵哲学的很大一部分致力于分析这类问题。我们的研究计划,“技术工件的双重性”,将处理一系列源于这两种概念化存在的问题。意向性概念化不仅适用于个人的心理状态,也适用于社会实体,即涉及多人的实体,如帮派、军队、银行、政府、国家等。它还向另一个方向延伸,可以这么说,包括(技术)人工制品,如螺丝刀、光谱仪和摩天大楼。研究计划关注的正是这类技术工件。它的主题是当人类在创造技术工件(由工程师设计的工件)时连接到物理世界时,这两种概念化的适用性及其相互关系。这里遇到的问题不同于心灵哲学中的问题。在这门学科中,问题之一是存在两种不同的精神状态概念化,其中一种在解释人类行为时似乎是多余的。正如下面将解释的那样,这里要解决的问题是理解和解释的概念化是不可或缺的
In our thinking, speaking and doing we employ two basic conceptualizations of the world. On the one hand, we see the world as consisting of physical objects interacting through causal connections. On the other hand, we see it as consisting of agents (primarily human beings), who intentionally represent the world and act in it. The great successes of natural science have suggested to many that the physical or material conceptualization fits every part of the empirically accessible universe, including humans. This idea, however, has created serious problems for the intentional conceptualization. It suggests that mental states are causally inefficacious in human actions, or conversely, that human action is causally overdetermined by mental states as well as brain states. Nowadays a large part of the philosophy of mind is devoted to analyzing these types of problems. Our research program, "The dual nature of technical artifacts", will address a set of problems that originate in the existence of these two conceptualizations. The intentional conceptualization applies not only to mental states of individual persons, but also to social entities, i.e., entities involving several persons, such as gangs, armies, banks, governments, countries, etc. And it stretches out in another direction, so to speak, to include (technical) artifacts, such as screwdrivers, spectrographs and skyscrapers. It is this category of technical artifacts on which the research program focuses. Its subject matter is the applicability of the two conceptualizations and their interrelatedness when human beings connect to the physical world in the creation of technical artifacts (artifacts designed by engineers). The problems encountered here are different from the ones in the philosophy of mind. In that discipline one problem among others is the existence of two alternative conceptualizations of mental states, where one seems to be superfluous in the explanation of human action. As will be explained below, the problem addressed here is the indispensability of both conceptualizations for understanding and explaining