Strategic Trade Policy and Signalling with Unobservable Costs
Strategic Trade Policy and Signalling with Unobservable Costs
复制标题
具有不可观察成本的战略贸易政策和信号
DOI：
10.1111/1467-9396.00090
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Donald J. Wright
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Donald J. Wright
在一个环境中，母公司的成本是私人信息，母公司的产出可以信号这些成本的外国竞争者和国内决策者。高成本的本土企业有动机将自己歪曲为低成本企业。这是理解的外国公司和国内的政策制定者，并在第一阶段的最佳每单位产出补贴的国内公司是小于它会如果国内公司的输出是不是一个信号的国内公司的成本。这些结果被推广到同时发送信号和通过价格发送信号的情况。版权所有1998年由布莱克韦尔出版有限公司。
In an environment in which home firm costs are private information, home firm output can signal these costs to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. High-cost home firms have an incentive to misrepresent themselves as low-cost. This is understood by the foreign firm and the home policymaker and results in the first-period optimal per-unit output subsidy to the home firm being less than it would be if home firm output was not a signal of home firm costs. These results are extended to the case of simultaneous signaling and signaling through price. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.