Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination
Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jbusres.2004.02.002
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发表时间：
2004-04
影响因子：
11.3
通讯作者：
Raihan Khan;Ravi Dharwadkar;Pamela Brandes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Raihan Khan;Ravi Dharwadkar;Pamela Brandes
有限的研究着眼于机构所有权方面如何影响高管薪酬。运用代理理论方法，我们研究了机构股权集中度和分散度如何影响CEO薪酬水平、薪酬组合和股票期权薪酬敏感性。我们发现，最大的所有者的集中度与较低的薪酬水平，以及较高的薪酬总额的比例和较低的比例的选择，总薪酬，但大股东的数量并不能预测CEO薪酬的任何方面。此外，机构所有权分散与薪酬水平的提高和激励性薪酬的更多使用有关。最后，更高的CEO所有权水平导致期权薪酬水平的显著降低，以及更高的工资与总薪酬的比率和更低的期权与总薪酬的比率。
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation.