How Do Minority Presidents Manage Multiparty Coalitions? Identifying and Analyzing the Payoffs to Coalition Parties in Presidential Systems
How Do Minority Presidents Manage Multiparty Coalitions? Identifying and Analyzing the Payoffs to Coalition Parties in Presidential Systems
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DOI：
10.1177/1065912917715912
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发表时间：
2017-12-01
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Chernykh, Svitlana
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chaisty, Paul;Chernykh, Svitlana
现代民主国家中少数派总统占多数，这使得研究人员将注意力集中在总统在立法议会中组建的多党联盟上。对联合总统制的分析几乎完全集中于拉丁美洲，尤其是巴西的总统制。它把多党总统联盟理解为内阁级别的结构，通过投资组合的回报来约束立法机构中各党派的支持。在本文中，我们在非拉丁美洲背景下探讨这一分析：后苏联时期的乌克兰。使用原始的定量和定性数据，我们发现投资组合收益是管理乌克兰联盟的重要工具。但我们也发现，少数派总统系统地依赖内阁以外立法政党的支持，并利用不同的回报来管理他们的支持。鉴于这种复杂性也存在于其他新兴民主国家，我们认为有必要区分少数派总统制中的内阁级和基层联盟。
The preponderance of minority presidents in modern democracies has concentrated the attention of researchers on the multiparty coalitions that presidents form to govern in legislative assemblies. This analysis of coalitional presidentialism has focused almost exclusively on presidential systems in Latin America, and Brazil in particular. It has understood multiparty presidential coalitions as cabinet-level constructs, which bind the support of parties in legislatures through portfolio payoffs. In this article, we explore this analysis in a non-Latin American context: post-Soviet Ukraine. Using original quantitative and qualitative data, we find that portfolio payoffs are an important tool for managing Ukrainian coalitions. But we also find that minority presidents have relied systematically on the support of legislative parties outside of the cabinet and have used different payoffs to manage their support. Given that this complexity also exists in other new democracies, we argue that there is a need to distinguish between cabinet-level and floor-level coalitions in minority presidential systems.