EMPLOYMENT BONUSES AND LABOR TURNOVER
EMPLOYMENT BONUSES AND LABOR TURNOVER
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DOI：
10.1086/298168
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发表时间：
1987-10-01
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
ORMISTON, MB
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BLAKEMORE, AE;LOW, SA;ORMISTON, MB
本文的目的是说明一个由刚性的基本工资和弹性的奖金组成的两部分薪酬体系如何减少流动。结果表明，奖金支付是一个有效的保留设备，如果它是降低风险，并与外部合同提供。据我们所知，这是第一次用美国而不是日本的数据来测试奖金支付模型。实证结果提示的条件，使奖金的一个重要的，甚至占主导地位，在工人保留的作用。
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a two-part compensation system composed of a rigid base salary and a flexible bonus can reduce turnover. It is shown that bonus pay is an effective retention device if it is risk reducing and is correlated with outside contract offers. For the first time, to the best of our knowledge, a model of bonus payments is tested with U.S. instead of Japanese data. The empirical results are suggestive of the conditions that give bonuses an important, even dominant, role in worker retention.