Transparency and natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa
Transparency and natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa
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DOI：
10.1016/j.resourpol.2022.102574
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发表时间：
2022-02-05
期刊：
影响因子：
10.2
通讯作者：
Shinkuma, Takayoshi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Okada, Keisuke;Shinkuma, Takayoshi
资源诅咒引起了经济学家和政策制定者的极大关注。解决这一诅咒的一项努力是《采掘业透明度倡议》，这是一项旨在提高资源丰富国家透明度和问责制的全球标准。本研究从理论和实证两方面评估了采掘业透明度倡议对自然资源租金的影响。我们提出了一个简单的模型来描述政治家和资源公司之间的勾结。我们的模型表明，根据EITI等计划对政客和资源公司进行监控可以有效防止非法交易。然后，使用1991年至2015年撒哈拉以南非洲国家的数据，我们表明EITI的实施增加了总的自然资源租金和矿产租金，尽管它对石油和天然气租金没有显着影响。
The resource curse has drawn much attention from economists and policymakers. An effort to resolve this curse is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global standard to improve transparency and accountability in resource-abundant countries. This study theoretically and empirically assesses the impact of EITI on natural resource rents. We present a simple model to describe the collusion between politicians and resource companies. Our model reveals that monitoring both politicians and resource companies under schemes such as EITI is effective in preventing illegal transactions. Then, using data for sub-Saharan African countries from 1991 to 2015, we show that EITI implementation increases total natural resource rents and mineral rents, although it has no significant impact on oil and natural gas rents.