Mixed oligopoly, endogenous timing and mergers
Mixed oligopoly, endogenous timing and mergers
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00164.x
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发表时间：
2011-09
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
José Méndez Naya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
José Méndez Naya
The present paper discusses endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly model, comprising one public firm and two private firms, assuming both a merger between the two private firms and between one private and one public firm. The paper proves that although a merger between the two private firms does not change the timing of the game, a merger between the public firm and the private firm into a mixed firm could change the market structure from Stackelberg to Cournot competition.
